




A Study of Virtuous and Vicious Anger
Zac Cogley
Northern Michigan University, zcogley@nmu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.nmu.edu/facwork_bookchapters
Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, Feminist Philosophy Commons, and the
Philosophy of Mind Commons
This Book Section/Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by The Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Book Sections/Chapters
by an authorized administrator of The Commons. For more information, please contact kclumpne@nmu.edu,kmcdonou@nmu.edu,
mburgmei@nmu.edu, bsarjean@nmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cogley, Zac. 2014. “A Study of Virtuous and Vicious Anger.” In Virtues and Their Vices, edited by Kevin Timpe and Craig Boyd,
199–224. New York: Oxford University Press.
9 
A Study of Virtuous and Vicious Anger 
Zac Cogley 
Getting angry [ . . . ] is easy and everyone can do it; but doing it to the right 
person, in the right amount, at the right time, for the right end, and in the 
right way is not easy, nor can everyone do it (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 
1109a27-29). 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I defend an account of an angrily virtuous, or patient, person 
informed by recent research on emotion in empirical and philosophical 
psychology. I argue that virtue and vice with respect to anger is determined 
by excellence and deficiency with respect to all three of anger's functions: its 
involvement in (1) appraisal of wrongdoing, (2) its role as a motivating force, 
and (3) its communicative function. Many accounts of anger assess it only 
with respect to one of these functions. Most typically, anger is assessed 
instrumentally with regard to its role in motivation. As I show, any singular 
evaluation of a person's anger will ignore important dimensions of anger that 
bear on virtue and vice; possessing excellence with respect to only one of 
anger's functions is thus insufficient for virtue.1 Further, lacking excellence 
1 The approach ends up being broadly Aristotelian in that there are several determinates of 
angry virtue and vice, but I am not engaged here in Aristotle exegesis. One more caveat: some 
virtue theorists hold that virtue requires persistence or unity in a person's ability to track and act 
on relevant considerations across a certain class of situations. Just how much persistence there 
must be for such activity to constitute virtue is a matter of significant recent dispute. Aristotle 
holds that an agent acts virtuously only if her choices of virtuous action proceed from 'a firm and 
unchangeable character' (Aristotle 1985, 1105a34-35) and some contemporary virtue theorists 
concur (Hursthouse 1999, 136). However, in part because of worries about situational effects on 
deliberation and behavior-see Merritt, Doris, and Harman (2010) for an excellent recent 
overview-some virtue theorists are willing to see the relevant dispositions as situationally 
dependent (Slingerland 2011) or 'frail and fragmentary in various ways' (Adams 2006, 119). In 
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with respect to all three functions corresponds to the two charactenstic vices 
of anger: wrath and meekness. A person who is excellent at all three of anger's 
functions will have the virtue of patience. However, because my account 
implies that virtue can require great anger, I largely avoid describing the 
angrily virtuous person as 'patient' to avoid the contemporary connotations 
of passivity and quietude associated with the term. 
As an additional way of focusing discussion, I will examine examples of 
angry virtue set by two well-known Americans: Frederick Douglass and 
Martin Luther King, Jr. Douglass was incensed by slavery (in part due to his 
early life as a slave) and worked to destroy it through oratory and political/ 
social action. Just over a century later, slavery had been eradicated nationwide 
but the civil and material welfare of black Americans still lagged substantially 
behind whites (and sadly, still does, on balance). King used massive nonviolent 
action and powerful speeches to fight against these injustices. I assume that 
both Douglass and King are widely thought to be exemplars of virtue, so their 
example of how to be properly angry will be a useful guide in my discussion. 
FUNCTION 1: APPRAISAL 
Appraisal as Cause 
There is no doubt that both Douglass and King experienced situations that 
would provoke anger in practically anyone. Contemporary psychological 
research on emotion validates this thought by individuating different emo-
tions via antecedent appraisals that elicit the emotion. Appraisals are thought 
to be a person's interpretations and evaluations of a situation (often, but not 
always, evaluated specifically in reference to the person feeling the emotion). 
So, for example, Richard Lazarus holds that anger depends on someone's 
behavior being construed as a 'personal slight or demeaning offense.'2 Philo-
sophical commentators like Jesse Prinz and Shaun Nichols generally concur, 
holding that 'Anger arises when people violate autonomy norms, which are 
norms prohibiting harms against persons.'3 While there is no question that 
anger has a close relation to the appraisals adduced here, these treatments 
make two errors about the relation of anger and appraisal. 
First, the relevant appraisal is construed too narrowly. It is common for 
anger to be elicited not only by slights or harms against persons, but also by 
what follows, I sidestep this issue by focusing on the considerations that a person must track and 
act on in order to display excellence with respect to anger's discrete functions. Whether or not 
anyone has those excellences in a robust enough way to constitute virtue is a topic for elsewhere. 
Lazarus {1991), 223. 3 Prinz and Nichols {2010), 122. 
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harms against nonhuman animals. Strangely, Prinz and Nichols themselves 
note this fact 4 Anger occurs not just in response to the violation of norms 
prohibiting harms against persons and not only with respect to personal slights 
and offenses. We can better handle these phenomena if we treat anger's 
appraisal more broadly, as Shaver et al. do, holding that the eliciting appraisal 
is that 'the situation is illegitimate, wrong, unfair, contrary to what ought to be.'5 
James Averill also holds that 'the typical instigation to anger is a value judgment. 
More than anything else, anger is an attribution of blame.'6 And what is it to 
attribute blame, other than to appraise someone as acting wrongfullyf 
I believe, then, that an angry person appraises her situation as containing 
wrongful conduct. This construal of anger's appraisal is capacious enough to 
handle anger at violations that don't harm persons, as well as the many situations 
in which we become incensed at the violations of autonomy norms, personal 
slights, and demeaning offenses. 
Appraisal as Conceptually Connected 
While my gloss on anger's appraisal more readily captures the voluminous 
situations in which we are likely to become angry, holding that anger is caused 
by an appraisal of a person's action as wrongful is the second mistake many 
theorists make about the relationship of anger and appraisal. There is no clear 
evidence that all episodes of anger are caused by a relevant appraisal and not 
all psychologists agree that appraisals always precede anger or are necessary 
for it.8 So what, then, does appraisal have to do with anger? I think we better 
understand the relationship between anger and appraisal (and emotion and 
appraisal, more generally) if we hold that anger need not be caused by an 
appraisal; rather, anger is an appraisal.9 
Consider hearing that a woman is angry with her boss because he doesn't 
respect her work. It would be quite natural, when hearing about such a case, 
to describe the woman as taking her boss to evaluate her work incorrectly. 
Or consider hearing that a man is angry at his doctor's indifferent attitude 
toward his medical problems. Again, it would be natural to describe the man 
as taking his doctor's bedside manner to be the wrong sort of model for 
4 Prinz and Nichols (2010), 130. Anger can also be elicited by the destruction, desecration, or 
disrespect of nonliving things like ideas, religious symbols, or historical artifacts. 
5 Shaver et al. (1987), 1078. 6 Averill (1983), 1150. 
7 While there has been much debate over whether or not the relevant appraisals are cogni-
tions, beginning with Zajonc ( 1980) and ( 1984), that debate is orthogonal to my concerns. For an 
excellent recent discussion of this issue, see Prinz (2004), 21-51. 
8 Berkowitz and Harmon-Jones (2004a), Berkowitz and Harmon-Jones (2004b), and 
Parkinson (1999). 
9 Parkinson ( 1997). 
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practitioner-patient interaction. Or consider hearing that senior citiZens are 
angry about the possibility that Medicare benefits will be curtailed. It would be 
natural to suppose that senior citizens think that curtailing Medicare is 
incorrect and negatively evaluate government actors who consider doing so. 
These cases exemplify a general truth: different emotion concepts are generally 
invoked in predictable patterns based on associated appraisals.10 Talk of 
emotion is conceptually bound to talk of appraisal; invocation of emotion is 
generally an invocation (either explicitly or implicitly) of appraisal.11 
Virtuous Anger as Fitting Anger 
So being angry with someone is (in part, at least) to appraise her or his conduct 
as wrongful. Thus, the first dimension of virtue with respect to anger is 
determined by the accuracy of a person's angry appraisal, or, as I Will say, 
following Justin D'Arms and Dan Jacobson's usage, the fittingness of angerY 
D'Arms and Jacobson point out that we commonly dispute whether things are 
truly sad, enviable, shameful, or worthy of pride or resentment. This practice 
presupposes that we can make sense of a particular kind of emotional appro-
priateness that is determined only by the accuracy of an emotion's evaluative 
presentation; that is, whether the thing in question has the features the 
emotion presents it as having. This sense of appropriateness is the fittingness 
of an emotion. When we observe that both Douglass and King had ample 
reason to be angry, we are implicitly invoking considerations having to do 
with anger's fit. 
Fittingness is analogous to the epistemic relation that holds between a true 
belief and the world. A fitting emotion presents the world as containing a 
particular set of features that the emotion correctly characterizes the world as 
having, just as a belief that is true presents the world as containing certain 
features or properties that the belief correctly represents the world as contain-
ing. 13 So anger is fitting for you to feel when, for example, it is directed toward 
a person who has wronged you out of ill will. 
But it is not enough for a particular instance of anger to be a completely fitting 
response that the anger be directed toward a situation where someone did 
10 Roseman (1991). 
11 While I hold that there is conceptual overlap between emotion and appraisal, I don't deny 
that you can appraise or evaluate a situation without becoming emotional about it. On my view, 
emotions are necessarily evaluations, but evaluations are not necessarily emotional. 
12 D'Arms and Jacobson (2000). 
13 Since part of virtue with respect to anger is determined by accurate perception, virtue with 
respect to anger relies on proper perception or judgment and thus requires other supporting 
virtues, like prudence. 
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something wrong or unjust. For anger's 'size' can vary by degree, 14 and should be 
roughly proportionate to the seriousness of the wrong in question as well as the 
person's relation to the wrong. For example, if the wrong in question is relatively 
minor and the person did not intentionally bring it about, I should be less angry 
than if the wrong is quite significant and the person specifically aimed at harming 
me; other things being equal, a greater degree of anger is fitting to feel toward 
someone who tries to ruin your career than is fitting to feel toward someone who 
forgets to water your office plant while you're away on a trip. 
Macalester Bell has recently argued that virtue with respect to anger is 
constituted by being fittingly angry-that is, being angry at the things befitting 
of anger's appraisal. 15 Drawing on Thomas Hurka and Robert Adams' char-
acterization of the virtuous person as loving good and hating evil, 16 Bell argues 
that being fittingly angry is a way of excellently hating, or being against, evil. 
Her account is valuable in recognizing that anger is a particularly appropriate 
response to injustice because it more accurately appraises injustice than other 
emotions, like disappointment, do. 17 And, echoing the point made earlier 
about the size of anger, on her view a person will be more virtuous if she is 
very angry at huge injustices than if she rages at minor affronts. Thus, an 
important component of virtue with respect to anger is feeling anger propor-
tionally toward situations where anger is fitting. 18 
Bell's account of virtuous anger has important attractions. For one, her 
account helps to capture our sense of the excellence of someone who is incensed 
by serious wrongs or injustice. Indeed, Bell argues that the magnificence of 
Douglass' fury at slavery is best captured by her fitting attitude account of virtue 
with respect to anger. She notes that 'Elizabeth Cady Stanton describes the first 
time she saw Douglass speak as follows: "He stood there like an African Prince, 
majestic in his wrath.'"19 One thing we find admirable in Douglass' vehement 
anger is that it correctly appraises, and is proportionate to, the great injustices to 
slaves that were a structural feature of American society in the 1800s. 
Bell's account also helps us to understand important aspects in which some-
one's anger can be vicious. For the account also implies that we lack excellence if 
we fail to be angry with people befitting of anger or we become angry in 
situations where it is unfitting. Thus, it helps us to understand as failing to be 
virtuous whites who angrily opposed Douglass and King's efforts. Even if the 
anger of some whites at Douglass and King was excellent with respect to 
motivation and communication (discussed below), they lacked a significant 
determinate of angry virtue by angrily being against good and for evil. 
14 D'Arms and jacobson (2000), 74. 15 Bell (2009). 
16 Hurka (2003) and Adams (2006). 17 Bell (2009), 178. 
18 Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung also argues that part of angry virtue concerns whether anger 
accurately characterizes its target (2009). 
19 Bell (2009), 166. 
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FUNCTION II: ANGER'S EFFECTS ON ACTION, 
MOTIVATION, AND DELIBERATION 
For the above reasons, there is much to recommend Bell's account of virtuous 
anger. But the fitting attitude account of angry virtue is incomplete. To see 
this, suppose that Douglass had been incensed by slavery but instead had 
simply wallowed in his rage, never stirring to combat the system he so 
despised. While he would have been angrily against the evils of slavery in 
one way, he would have lacked another powerful way of angrily being against 
it: motivation and action.20 
Excellence or virtue with respect to anger isn't exhausted by simply being 
fittingly angry at the proper objects; being for or against something-loving 
good and hating evil-in the sense tied to virtue is exemplified by engagement 
of the will.21 As Adams notes, 'Being for or against goods in thought or 
attitude or feeling deserves less weight in the overall evaluation of character 
if it remains passive, involving no tendency or will to show itself in ethically 
important action or inaction. One who is not disposed to contribute causally 
to the realization, if that were possible, is less strongly for it.'22 So one aspect of 
excellence with respect to anger is accurately appraising, through thoughts, 
attitudes, and feelings, the situations and conduct of other people who con-
front you. But you are less excellently angry if you have fitting thoughts, 
attitudes, and emotions that do not move you to action. Douglass and King 
both illustrate this. Their excellence consisted not only in the fact that they 
were incensed by the injustices they faced-they properly appraised them-
but also that they were powerfully motivated to fight against injustice through 
oratory, action, and prose. 
Interestingly, while Bell's fitting attitude account of angry virtue does cor-
rectly identify part of virtue with respect to anger, it constitutes a significant 
departure from the predominant way that virtue with respect to anger has been 
historically conceptualized, which is simply via anger's motivational effects on 
the person who feels it. Bell's account is, in part, motivated by a reaction to such 
views. This omission would be warranted if the fitting attitude account captured 
all of virtue and vice with respect to anger. But as the examples of Douglass and 
King suggest, another facet of angry virtue consists in being moved by anger to 
fight against, protest, or change the things with which one is angry. Since the 
fitting attitude view doesn't capture this, it is incomplete. 
20 Suggestively, Douglass describes his angry, violent resistance to a beating at the hands of 
the notorious slave-breaker, Edward Covey, as pivotal in committing himself to his own 
freedom; see Douglass (1997), 79. 
21 Adams (2006), 17. Adams gives voice to Aquinas' view that we are most virtuous when 
each of our intellectual, sensitive, and bodily parts is oriented toward virtue. For discussion 
of Aquinas on this point, see Rota (2007), 412. 
22 Adams (2006), 44. 
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We thus need to consider the relationship of anger to action, motivation, 
and deliberation to determine the motivational and deliberative profile of an 
excellently angry person. One of the most common approaches to anger in this 
realm holds that anger produces relatively stable motivational effects, which 
then relatively reliably lead to action. I term this view of anger the hydraulic 
view. Whether to feel angry on this view is thus a matter of whether the 
motivational effects of anger are, on balance, conceived as harmful or 
beneficial-but there is significant disagreement about which, on balance, is 
correct. In the next two sections I discuss both pessimistic and optimistic 
views about these motivational effects. 
Hydraulic Pessimists 
Pessimists who hold the standard hydraulic view believe that the normal motiv-
ational effects that are the result of anger are problematic. For example, Derk 
Pereboom has suggested that accepting his hard incompatibilist view of moral 
responsibility would be valuable in leading to diminished anger. Though Per-
eboom recognizes that anger's motivational effects may sometimes be beneficial, 
he argues that on balance anger is a harmful passion and that if we moderate or 
eliminate it, 'our lives might well be better for it.'23 Robert Thurman is inspired 
by a strand of Buddhist thought to take a more extreme tack, claiming that 
'[A)nger can be totally eradicated. It absolutely is a deadly sin. It is completely 
destructive, unjustified in any circumstance. We must manage it out of ex-
istence . . . . It is a fire and can only burn us.'24 Pereboom and Thurman are giving 
modern expression to the view forcefully put forth by Seneca two millennia prior: 
If you choose to view [anger's] results and the harm of it, no plague has cost the 
human race more dear. You will see bloodshed and poisoning, the vile counter-
charges of criminals, the downfall of cities and whole nations given to destruc-
tion, princely persons sold at public auction, houses put to the torch, and 
conflagration that halts not within the city-walls, but makes great stretches of 
the country glow with hostile flame.25 
If the pessimist view is correct, things look pretty grim. According to Thur-
man, "'War" is but the name for "organized anger,"'26 and Seneca clearly 
concurs. If they are right, then it would seem that virtue with respect to anger 
would demand feeling little, or no, anger. One can hear them urging that 
excellence would consist in making fitting appraisals nonemotionally, so that 
we will not be lead by our emotional responses to violence and aggression. 
23 Pereboom (2001), 213. 24 Thurman (2005), 5. 
25 Seneca ( 1995), Ill. For further discussion of Stoic, as well as Buddhist, views on anger, see 
Vemezze (2007). 
26 Thurman (2005}, II. 
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Some psychologists, most notably Leonard Berkowitz, have defended claims 
that offer some support for Pereboom, Thurman, and Seneca's pessimist 
hydraulic view of anger. Berkowitz holds that the experience of anger accom-
panies aggressive tendencies, that is, behavior aimed at injuring someone 
physically or psychologically, where that behavior is unwanted by the person 
aggressed towardP Though he holds that angry feelings arise concurrently with 
the motivation to aggress, and the feelings themselves only parallel the instiga-
tion to aggression rather than cause it, anger might appear to be negatively 
implicated by his view. 
Further, pessimists may urge that anger's negative effects on us are not 
exhausted by effecting aggression, as Montaigne implies: 
Aristotle says that anger sometimes serves as a weapon for virtue and valor. That 
is quite likely; yet those who deny it answer humorously that it is a weapon whose 
use is novel. For we move other weapons, this one moves us; our hand does not 
guide it, it guides our hand; it holds us, we do not hold it.28 
Montaigne's point is that anger bypasses calm deliberation and often leads to 
hasty, impulsive, and sometimes irrational action-whether or not such action 
is aggressive. Psychological evidence suggests anger does have important effects 
on deliberation and social perception. For example, angry people are more likely 
to attribute harmful intent to others in ambiguous social situations.29 Attribu-
tions of blame can, in tum, enter into an escalating feedback cycle with anger.3° 
Angry people also tend to be optimistic about the success of chosen courses of 
action31 due to a sense that they have significant control over their situation.32 
Further, 'they are eager to make decisions and are unlikely to stop and ponder or 
carefully analyze,'33 causing them to simply ignore the probabilities of different 
courses of action and take risky actions that would lead to desirable results but 
have a low probability of succeeding.34 When they do take action, angry people 
are more likely to be punitive toward those they blame. 35 Even worse, these 
effects are at least sometimes realized independently of the conscious awareness 
of people who are angry, which is especially problematic given anger's effects on 
deliberation and resultant action. 
Hydraulic Optimists 
Effects that look damning to some recommend anger to others; both historic-
ally and in contemporary philosophical scholarship there are quite a few 
27 Berkowitz (1993), 59 and (1999), 425. 28 Montaigne (1958), 545. 
29 Keltner, Ellsworth, and Edwards (1993), 751. 30 Quigley and Tedeschi (1 996). 
31 Lerner and Keltner (2001). 32 Lerner and Keltner (2000). 
33 Lerner and Tiedens (2006), 132. 34 Leith and Baumeister (1996). 
35 Lerner, Goldberg, and Tetlock (1998). For an excellent overview of recent empirical study 
of anger's effects on judgment and decision-making, see Litvak et al. (2010). 
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hydraulic optimists about the motivational effects of anger. Interestingly, 
Aristotle was more of an optimist about the value of anger, though he shares 
with the pessimists the idea that anger motivates vengeful actions. On his view, 
'Anger may be defined as an impulse, accompanied by pain, to a conspicuous 
revenge for a conspicuous slight directed without justification towards what 
concerns oneself or towards what concerns one's friends.'36 Aristotle is more 
comfortable with the idea that revenge can be justified than most contempor-
ary philosophers; he holds that sometimes the angry desire for revenge is the 
right desire to have because it virtuously motivates vengeful actions. Aquinas 
follows Aristotle in agreeing that anger involves a desire to punish in the 
service of revenge and that such retribution can be just if properly motivated 
and proportional to the offense.37 
Without agreeing with Aristotle that anger involves a desire for revenge, 
several contemporary theorists have emphasized that anger may produce 
motivations that serve morally laudatory purposes. For example, Audre Lorde 
writes, 
Eve!)' woman has a well-stocked arsenal of anger potentially useful against those 
oppresstons, personal and institutional, which brought the anger into being. 
Focused with precision it can become a powerful source of energy serving progress 
and change. 38 
[A) nger between peers births change, not destruction, and the discomfort and sense 
ofloss it causes is not fatal, but a sign of growth. My response to racism is anger.39 
Marguerite LaCaze argues in a similar vein that resentment can spur action 
that aims at protesting or removing injustice.40 Lisa Tessman has recently 
argued that having a tendency to anger can be a virtue under oppression 
because of the possibility that anger will eventually lead to the greater flour-
ishing of the angry person or other members of society.41 And Rebecca 
Konyndyk DeYoung notes that properly directed anger can even play a role 
in honoring promises and upholding the law.42 
Psychological evidence suggests the optimists are on to something. While 
the pessimists are correct that anger is a common and powerful cause of 
aggression,43 anger is neither necessary nor sufficient for aggression;44 not all 
aggression is caused by anger.45 Finally, the likelihood of aggression following 
an elicitor of anger is highly sensitive to contextual features like reputational 
36 Nicomachean Ethics, 1378a-1378b. 37 STII-11.158.2. 
38 Lorde (1997), 280. 39 Lorde (1997), 283 . 
.j() LaCaze (2001), 41. LaCaze follows James Mark Baldwin (1960) in taking resentment to be 
'An emotion of displeasure arising from a sense of injury to oneself or another, and prompting to 
the resistance of such injury' (La Caze 2001, 33). Though she distinguishes resentment from 
an§er, she does not indicate how they differ. 
1 Tessman (2005), 165. 42 DeYoung (2009), 130. 
43 Baumeister and Bushman (2007), 66. 44 Averill (1982); Tavris (1989). 
45 Buck (1999). 
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consequences, the ability and willingness of victims to retaliate, and the likeli-
hood of reprisals from third parties,46 suggesting that the interaction between 
anger and aggression cannot be a simple causal mechanism. (It's not a coinci-
dence that playground bullies select victims who can't or won't retaliate.) It thus 
appears unwarranted to impugn anger for all aggression and violence--at least 
some people can, and do, get angry without aggressing or being violent, and 
much unjust violence is not the result of anger. 
To the extent that psychologists have uncovered motivations that are 
universally characteristic of angry people, they have found that anger arouses 
or energizes people when they feel it and motivates people feeling anger to 
approach the target of their anger to try to change their situation,47 but need 
not involve aggression. In James Averill's seminal psychological study, anger 
led to physical aggression ten per cent of the time and to verbal aggression half 
of the time.48 Individual differences (no doubt resulting from various sources) 
likely play a significant role. As Georges Steffgen and Jan Pfetsch put it, 'anger 
management may be useful training for some people lacking the awareness 
and cognitive skills to cope with aggression, but it is not a magic bullet for all 
forms of aggression.'49 Further, it's not even clear that anger that motivates 
revenge or aggression will be irrational, unjust or fail to be virtuous, as 
Aristotle and Aquinas suggest. Whether or not angry revenge is vicious will 
depend quite a bit on the form that the revenge or aggression takes. 5° If you 
steal my bike and I become angry and respond by aggressively taking it back, it 
is not obvious that I have demonstrated a vice. Likewise, a particularly cutting 
reply to the insult you direct at me might be excellent in being just the thing to 
get you to reconsider your behavior. 
Defending Angry Motivation 
As the angry person appraises the one with whom she is angry as acting 
wrongfully and is typically moved to stop or call into question the wrongful 
conduct, it appears that a function of anger is motivating the angry to address 
disputes about proper conduct and justice. 51 In spite of its sometimes negative 
uses, anger has value in dispute resolution. Of course, just as there is no 
guarantee that disputes will always be addressed in the best possible way 
when the disputants are not angry, there is no guarantee that anger's motiv-
ational effects will redound to the good. But expunging anger from our set of 
46 Buss and Duntley (2006). 
47 See Harmon-Jones and Harmon-Jones (2007), 103-5 and Baumeister and Bushman 
(2007), 67. 
48 Averill (1982). 49 Steffgen and Pfetsch (2007). 50 French (2001). 
51 Tavris (1989), 54. James Averill also emphasizes anger's role as an 'informal judiciary' 
(1979). 
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responses would, I argue, impoverish our moral repertoire. To see the motiv-
ational value of anger, it is worth contrasting it with two other emotions that 
could be felt in response to a dispute: sadness and fear. The characteristic 
motivational responses of sadness are to yield or submit; for fear they are to 
escape or avoid.52 Certainly such responses to a dispute may sometimes be 
rational, but they do nothing to address or change the terms of the dispute. 
Both sadness and fear can mean giving in or giving up. Anger has more 
beneficial motivational effects in that it moves angry people to engage with 
perceived wrongdoers. 
The potential benefit of angry motivation is evident in collective action 
problems such as resource disputes. One way of studying the dynamics of 
resource disputes has been in ultimatum games.53 In such a game, one subject 
(the offerer) controls resources (say, $10). The offerer makes an offer to another 
subject (the respondent) to divide the resources {$7 offerer, $3 respondent). The 
respondent then accepts the offer or refuses it. Both subjects know the amount 
to be divided and the rules of negotiation: a rejection means both subjects get 
nothing; an acceptance means both subjects get the amounts offered. While 
game theory would suggest that all offers should involve splits that heavily 
favor the offerer and that all offers should be accepted, these predictions are 
consistently incorrect. In fact, offers to respondents tend to exceed forty per 
cent of the resources and fifteen to twenty per cent of offers are rejected.54 
A plausible explanation of these findings is that respondents expect fairness; if 
they don't receive an offer they take to be fair, they angrily reject it.55 While 
ensuring neither player receives any of the resources is a suboptimal result, it is 
likely that an offerer's knowledge of how angry respondents will act motivates 
him to offer a more equal split, leading to better results for all. 
In another suggestive study, Fehr and Gachter studied what is known as 
'altruistic punishment,' where people punish others in ways costly to the 
punishers and where the punishers receive no material benefit.56 Such third 
party norm enforcement appears to be a paradigm feature of human moral-
ity.57 Fehr and Gachter's study examined the prevalence of free-riding in a 
situation where there is a common good. Punishments of free-riders were 
common and were reported by punishers as expressions of anger. Free-riders 
also perceived their punishers as angry and this led to positive behavior 
change-free-riders were less likely to free-ride in the future, even when 
they interacted with a totally new group of people. Fehr and Gachter go so 
far as to suggest that the mechanism of angry punishment may be a better 
52 Fernandez (2010), 500. 
53 Experimental research on such games began with Giith, Schmittberger. and Schwarze 
(1982). 
54 Ochs and Roth (1989). 
56 Fehr and Gachter (2002). 
55 Pillutla and Murnighan (1996). 
57 Haidt (2001), 826. 
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explanation of human cooperation than kin selection, direct reciprocity, or 
reputation formation.58 
What is especially important about these studies is that they show how the 
effects on motivation and deliberation the pessimists want to emphasize as 
problematic can have effects that redound to the good. People who are likely 
or known to become angry at perceived transgressions are less likely to be 
taken advantage of-that is part of the reason angry people are thought to be 
'taking a stand' against the transgression in question.59 It's true that angry 
confrontations may be individually costly in that instance, but they may ward 
off more serious future conflicts. It is important that angry people may 
discount costs and remain focused on their target if their anger is to effectively 
dissuade others from wrongful conduct and to encourage (through an implicit 
threat) beneficial actions. It might be that if other human beings could always 
be counted on to act beneficently and justly, we would have no need for 
anger.60 But given that this is not true, anger is required for us to take the 
stands that need taking, rather than passively acquiesce in the face of wrong-
doing. Finally, a person whose anger toward a wrongdoer leads her to confront 
the perpetrator of the wrong will often be happier, or at least less unhappy, 
than if she failed to act on her anger. By doing something, she will have taken a 
stand against what she regards as wrongful rather than passively standing by, a 
fact of which she should feel proud. 
A Gesture at Excellence for Motivation and Action 
It is extremely difficult to describe angrily excellent motivations in the abstract 
because so many different factors contribute to an action's moral desirability. 
However, it may be possible to extract some lessons about proper motivation 
from the work of Martin Luther King, J r and research describing assertiveness 
training.61 Nonviolent resistance may be the most virtuous way to respond in 
the political realm and virtue in the interpersonal case bears some similarity. 
As King puts it in his essay 'Showdown for Nonviolence': 
I think we have come to the point where there is no longer a choice now between 
nonviolence and riots. It must be militant, massive nonviolence, or riots. The 
discontent is so deep, the anger so ingrained, the despair, the restlessness so wide, 
that something has to be brought into being to serve as a channel through which 
these deep emotional feelings, these deep angry feelings, can be funneled. There 
has to be an outlet, and I see this campaign as a way to transmute the inchoate 
58 Fehr and Gachter (2002), 137. 59 Bell (2009), 178. 
60 Even if other humans always did act well, there might still be virtue in possessing 
the disposition to become angry if occasion arose. 
61 Duckworth and Mercer (2006). 
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rage of the ghetto into a constructive and creative channel. It becomes an outlet 
for anger.62 
King implies that anger is going to make the residents of the ghetto do 
something, but that their actions can either be excellent in being constructive 
and creative, or lack excellence by resulting in riots. 
I want to suggest that the virtuously angry person is assertively resistant. 
This means she first confronts the target of her anger in an attempt to bring 
the target's attention to her cause for anger. She then asks after or demands an 
explanation or justification; if the justification is insufficient, she acts to change 
the situation. Of course, there will be situations in which this ordering should 
be inverted: if someone is attacking your child, it will be more excellent to try 
to stop the attack first, rather than demand an explanation of what is occur-
ring. However, when something of immense moral significance does not hang 
on immediate action, the above characterization holds. 
This pattern of angry motivation is hypothesized to generally lead to better 
results than either excessively passive or excessively aggressive patterns. In 
part, this is because this method has a different aim from aggressive action. 
Aggressive action aims to win at all costs, while assertive resistance 'does not 
seek to defeat or humiliate the opponent, but to win his friendship and 
understandmg.'63 The end is not simply to change the unjust or wrong 
situation, but to gain the other party's allegiance to the idea that the situation 
should be changed by convincing the other party to share the angry person's 
appraisal of the situation, rather than cow him into submitting to a request. 
Importantly, the benefits of this method do not all lie in the potential out-
comes of this process, such as effectively changing the situation. Other im-
portant goods like personal control and personal respect, which may not be 
best captured instrumentally, are more likely to be achieved and maintained 
by the assertively resistant person.64 This is partly in virtue of the assertively 
resistant person seeking to convince her interlocutor that her allegiance to her 
appraisal of the situation is correct and that her actions respect his moral 
capacities. Further, because assertive resistance is less likely to 'blow up' into a 
conflagration of insults or aggressive behavior because norms of respect are 
followed, the good of personal control is more likely to be achieved by this 
method. An excellently angry person rightly looks with pride toward disputes 
where she effectively communicates her complaint (she avoids meek 
62 King, Jr (1986a), 69. While King is justly lauded by moral theorists, some theorists (Stern 
1974, 78; Watson 1993, 148) seem to think that King's method of nonviolent resistance involved 
a call to expunge anger from our lives. Such theorists appear to have not taken King at his own 
words. 
63 King, Jr (1986b), 87. While not all friendship is worth having, I read King here as suggesting 
the aim is to win over the opponent in a way compatible with future friendship. 
64 Duckworth and Mercer (2006), 80. 
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capitulation) while not resorting to insult or injury (she avoids aggressive 
behavior), even when she fails to achieve what she aimed with the assertively 
resistant confrontation. 
FUNCTION III: ANGRY COMMUNICATION 
I now want to highlight a point that was implicitly broached in the previous 
section. There I urged that part of being virtuously motivated by anger 
involves being assertively resistant, and that part of the assertively resistant 
person's excellence involves asking after or demanding justification from the 
target of her anger. This aspect of angry motivation invokes the communi-
cative function of anger. While it would be possible to treat this as simply a 
minor complication of the previous section on motivation-as most commu-
nication involves some psychological structure that could be described as 
motivating or moving a person to behave in a particular way-it's worth 
discussing in its own right for two reasons. First, at least some of the features 
of angry behavior don't appear to be the result of anything like a conscious 
motivation, so these ways of behaving angrily don't appear to be easily 
construed as full-blooded actions, or perhaps even the result of actional 
motivation. Second, up until now I have been arguing that anger has motiv-
ational and appraisal functions. In doing so, I implied that we could judge the 
virtue or vice of a person by looking only at what she does in response to her 
circumstances. I now want to make clear that this focus is too narrow. Virtue 
with respect to anger is determined not just by what you do, but by what you 
do together with others in expressing and communicating your anger to them 
in an effort to influence their appraisals and behaviors.65 Aristotle recognized 
these points, placing one sustained discussion of anger in the Rhetoric. 
Communicative features 
One of the most striking things about anger is that it is associated with 
characteristic facial expressions.66 This is some evidence that prototypic emo-
tional responses are not only appraisals of a situation that generate character-
istic motivations, but that they are also communicative responses. In fact, the 
characteristic facial expressions associated with different emotions seem to be 
associated more with interpersonal interactions, rather than the peak of an 
emotional experience.67 For example, you are more likely to smile broadly 
65 Parkinson (1996). 66 Ekman (1999). 
67 Fernandez-Dols and Ruiz-Belda (1995). 
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when bowling a strike after you turn to face the other bowlers than when you 
initially knock down all the pins.68 Other evidence comes from the fact 
that specific speech patterns (including rate of articulation, intensity, and 
frequency of vocal fold vibrations) are associated with different emotions, 
including anger.69 Emotions are also associated with bodily movements and 
postures that at least partially differentiate different emotions. 70 
These communications are then observed, responded to, or ignored by 
other people and the responses--or lack thereof-provide another opportun-
ity for emotional engagement and transformation. For example, in conversa-
tion, people continually and automatically mimic and synchronize their 
movements with those of their interlocutors, including such reactions as 
changes in facial expression, posture, and movement.71 Our subjective emo-
tional experiences appear to be affected by feedback from this mimicry, 
leading to the phenomenon where people may 'catch' the emotions of 
others.72 And people routinely interpret the facial expressions of others as 
conveying emotions the others are feeling, as well as the intentions and wishes 
of the person emoting. Relevantly, anger expressions are most likely to be 
interpreted as conveying intentions or requests.73 
Angry people are thus typically engaging in communication which not only 
communicates to the target of their anger that the target has acted wrongfully, 
but also urges others to share their anger at the target and thereby, implicitly 
at least, share their appraisal of the target. Further, a person's anger also 
may urge others to adopt similar motivations, communicate relevant motiv-
ational tendencies and appraisal to the target, and demand that others change 
their behavior?4 When a person's anger is fitting and her motivations are 
excellent, then her excellence is furthered on an additional axis if she can get 
her interlocutors to be angry at the same things. By doing so, she will lead 
them to feel fitting anger which may, in turn, lead them to have excellent 
motivations. 
I Have a Dream 
Martin Luther King, Jr's most famous speech, the 'I Have a Dream' address to 
the 1963 March on Washington, D.C. for Civil Rights, is widely remembered 
for the eponymous portions of the speech where King enumerates the dreams 
he has for the United States, and for its triumphantly hopeful ending, 'Free at 
last, free at last; thank God Almighty, we are free at last.'75 Less commonly 
68 Kraut and Johnston (1979). 69 Scherer (1986) and Scherer etal. (1991). 
70 Wallbott (1998). 71 Chartrand and Bargh (1999). 
72 Hatfield, Cacioppo, and Rafsson (1993). 73 Horstmann (2003). 
74 Horstmann (2003). 5 King, Jr (1986a), 220. 
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remembered are the beginning and middle portions of the speech that lay the 
groundwork for the successful ending.76 Here I rely on parts of King's 'I Have 
a Dream' speech to illustrate the argument that another dimension in which 
we should evaluate someone's anger is by how she communicates it. Part of the 
success of 'I Have a Dream' is that it communicates anger excellently. 
Near the beginning of the speech, King notes that one hundred years after 
Emancipation 
[T]he Negro is still not free; one hundred years later, the life of the Negro is still 
sadly crippled by the manacles of segregation and the chains of discrimination; 
one hundred years later, the Negro lives on a lonely island of poverty in the midst 
of a vast ocean of material prosperity; one hundred years later, the Negro is still 
languished in the comers of American society and finds himself in exile in his 
own land.77 
In making these observations, King implicitly asks his audience to share his 
appraisal of the state of American society under segregation and to be angry 
about it. That he implicitly seeks to incite anger in his audience is supported 
not just by his listing injustices for which anger is fitting, but also by describing 
the situation of blacks using metaphors like 'defaulting on a promise' and 
'being given a bad check,' more or less common social situations which his 
audience will have implicitly labeled as fitting for anger?8 But he not only 
urges his audience to share his appraisals, he urges them to be moved to 
correct these injustices by exhorting 'This is no time to engage in the luxury of 
cooling off or to take the tranquUizing drug of gradualism. Now is the time to 
make real the promises of democracy.'79 UntU full rights are gained, 'We can 
never be satisfied' and so his listeners must 'go back to the slums and 
ghettos . .. knowing that somehow this situation can, and will be changed.'80 
Part of the rhetorical success of the 'I Have a Dream' speech involves King 
subtly inciting anger in his audience, both to deepen their appraisal of the 
relevant injustices and to motivate them to act so as to eliminate those 
injustices.81 Further, the 'I have a dream' passages and the triumphant last 
lines of the speech must be understood to rely on the previous sections for a 
significant part of their rhetorical force. It is only after anger has been induced in 
the audience that the promise of the future removal of the object of the audience's 
76 See, for example, the many versions of the speech on youtube.com that begin with the 
'I have a dream' refrain. 
77 King, Jr (1986c), 217. 
78 Haidt (200 I), 823 argues that King's use of metaphor and visual imagery was more effective 
than logic would have been in communicating the injustices of racial segregation. 
79 King, Jr (1986c), 218. 80 King. Jr (1986c), 218-19. 
81 See Haidt (2001), 819 for discussion of a theory of moral judgment that makes sense of this 
phenomenon. A helpful discussion of Haidt's and others views on moral judgment is Morrow 
(2009). 
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anger can render the speech's resolution so complete. Thus, King's speech is an 
exemplar of excellence with respect to the communication of anger. 
Displaying Anger 
There is one more way in which the communicative aspect of anger is relevant 
to angry excellence. In order to successfully fulfill its communicative function, 
anger must be seen by others as an appraisal of wrongness-not simply 
discounted. Because of this, successful anger must conform to unwritten 
'display rules' that prescribe how to communicate anger to others.82 Such 
rules vary across cultures and social groups, as well as between genders and 
families; we are socialized to comply with such rules from a very early age.83 
An angry person must attend to such rules if she is to be excellent with respect 
to communication. However, while nuanced attention to display rules is 
necessary for excellence, such attention does not guarantee successful angry 
communication. While an excellently angry person is sensitive to the fact that 
different groups implicitly subscribe to different norms or cultural differences 
for expression of anger, if her interlocutors are not sensitive to such possibil-
ities, her anger may fail to be communicatively successful.84 
As Jody Miller documents, such a situation besets young black women who 
are the victims of urban violence and harassment; they are in a double bind 
with respect to their ability to use anger to respond to their mistreatment. 
Girls' responses to harassment, when assertive or aggressive, often resulted in 
more vicious mistreatment, especially in the forms of gender harassment and 
violent overtures. Their attempts to defend themselves were read by young men 
as disrespect, and the incidents quickly escalated into hostile confrontations when 
young women challenged young men's sexual and gender entitlements. Thus, 
young women were in a lose lose situation. Every available avenue for responding 
to sexual harassment reproduced their disempowered positions vis-a-vis young 
men.85 
82 Ekman, Sorenson, and Friesen (1969); Ekman and Friesen (2003). 
83 Malatesta and Haviland (1982). One example of how such rules can change is provided by 
Francesca Cancian and Steven Gordon, who argue that between 1900 and 1979, the social norms 
governing women's expression of anger to their spouses loosened considerably. In the early part 
of the century, women were advised not to express their anger at home; that counsel eventually 
shifted to urging women to express their anger to their husbands. As they note, 'The normative 
shift toward encouraging women to express their dissatisfactions and anger supported more 
equal power between the sexes .. • . advising wives to express dissatisfactions and anger made 
women more aware of their own interests and desires, and better able to defend them' (Cancian 
and Gordon 1988, 320). 
84 Elfenbein and Ambady (2002) . 85 Miller (2008), Ill. 
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Thus, even a communicatively excellent angry person's success is partially 
determined by the willingness of others to not simply dismiss her angry 
displays out of hand.86 Effectively leading others to share the appraisal and 
motivations of anger requires their cooperation and their sensitivity to the fact 
that your way of angrily expressing yourself may not fit with their norms for 
emotional communication. Thus, a person's possession of communicative 
excellence with respect to anger is often not simply a matter of how she 
responds to the actions of others, but relates to how people respond together. 87 
While an excellently angry person respects cultural and interpersonal norms 
for the assertive communication of anger, for her anger to be successful, she 
requires that her interlocutors are sensitive to the possibility that they mis-
construe the nature of her angry response. 
We surely want to say, however, that King's communication in 'I Have a 
Dream' is excellent even if the speech is heard by a group of committed white 
racists who are not moved by it. And part of what seems so terrible about the 
situation facing the young women Miller describes is that even if they respond 
excellently, their anger is discounted. We can't, then, say that a person is 
communicatively excellent just in case her angry display is actually received 
well by others. I propose, instead, that we should count a person as communi-
catively excellent when she displays her anger in a way that would be received 
well by suitably virtuous interlocutors. Saying exactly when someone's angry 
communication is excellent, excessive, or deficient will thus be a complicated 
matter in that it will depend on characterizations of how compassionate, 
humble, temperate, just, and prudent people would respond to a given bout 
of angry communication. Space doesn't permit more exhaustive examination 
of this proposal here; however, I would like to mention four additional 
advantages of this account. 
First, as suggested above, the idea that excellent angry communication is 
what would be well-received by virtuous interlocutors allows us to capture the 
social nature of angry virtue without being forced to say that the response of 
someone's actual interlocutors determines whether she is excellent. Second, 
the account allows us to characterize cases where someone's formative cir-
cumstances or other factors make it difficult, or even impossible, for that 
person to be excellently angry. Perhaps this is true for some of the young men 
mentioned by Miller, who are unable to see a questioning of their perceived 
entitlements to women's bodies as anything other than an attack on their 
manhood. Third, the account helps us understand why disputes about 
whether someone has been excellently angry so often concern the manner in 
which someone has expressed their anger and why such disputes can appear so 
86 Lorde (1997), 131 and Campbell (1994), 48. 
87 For a discussion emphasizing another way in which character is interpersonal, see Merritt 
(2009). 
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intractable. Disputing parties are engaged in arguing about what an idealized 
respondent would have done in response to the given expression of anger in a 
particular social context, a topic that easily lends itself to vagueness and 
disagreement. Finally, because a virtuous interlocutor will be able to properly 
receive a variety of angry communications, the account allows for the possi-
bility that a variety of types of angry communication are compatible with 
virtue. 
THE ACCOUNT OF VICE 
Viciousness 
So far I've presented an account of angry virtue composed of three distinct 
excellences. On this account, a person is angrily virtuous when her anger is 
excellent along three dimensions: her anger is fitting, it motivates her to take 
assertively resistant actions, and she communicates her anger to others with 
nuanced attention to appropriate social norms governing its display. We can 
also use this account to characterize the extremes of viciousness with respect to 
anger: the meek person and the wrathful one. 
First, of course, one can lack excellence in failing to be angry at the things 
for which anger is fitting or by being angry at things for which anger isn't 
fitting. The first vice might be termed insensitivity to the wrong or unjust, 
while the latter seems describable as a sort of hypersensitivity. Further, a 
person can exhibit a failure of excellence if he becomes angrier about the 
failure of a bookstore to order a book than about the fact that a student was 
ruthlessly assaulted. 
So the extent to which a person's anger proportionately fails to track wrongs 
and injustices is a significant aspect of vice. But even if anger is fittingly felt, 
there are still important ways in which someone might fail to be fully virtuous. 
For example, a person who feels fitting anger but who is not moved to act 
against or protest the situation is too passive; one whose fitting anger always 
leads her to aggressive and violent action also fails to demonstrate virtue. The 
viciousness of people who are too angrily passive or angrily aggressive depends 
first on the likelihood that both passivity and aggressiveness are less likely to 
bring about a morally desirable outcome than the motivations of the assert-
ively resistant. Because the passive person is unlikely to confront those with 
whom he is angry, the likelihood that the wrong or injustice will continue is 
high. So the passive person stands very ineffectively against the wrongful, even 
if his anger correctly appraises it as such. On the other hand, the aggressive 
person is more likely than the passive person to change the situation her anger 
takes as its target-and in certain circumstances might even be more likely to 
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do so than the assertively resistant person. However, the aggressive person's 
actions are more likely than the assertively resistant person's to be appraised as 
wrongful by the anger of those they confront; thus the actions of the aggressive 
person will often simply replace one conflict with another. One of the most 
common findings in research on aggression is that aggressive action tends to 
lead to aggressive retaliation.88 
The viciousness of the passive and the aggressive extends also to the goods 
of personal control and personal respect, though in different ways. The passive 
person either fails to feel anger when it is fitting and so fails to be moved by 
anger to resist that which is wrongful, or he overly controls himself so as to 
remain nonconfrontational. I have discussed the first defect above, so I will not 
discuss it further here. The second defect is characterized by a failure to take 
moral claims, both one's own and the claims of others, seriously-a failure of 
disrespect to morality and oneself. The passive person also exercises too much 
self-control in her restraint. On the other hand, given her motives, the 
aggressive person shows too little self-restraint and thus fails to respect others 
in acting on her anger, whatever her intentions. Her actions are oriented 
toward success independently of gaining the assent of others, which disre-
spects their capacity to deliberate about and choose ends for themselves. She 
treats them as beings to be moved around, avoided, or destroyed, but not as 
persons to be convinced. 
Deficient viciousness with respect to the communicative function is char-
acterized by improperly communicating anger to others and failing to com-
municate the intensity of one's anger-and thus the seriousness of the wrong. 
Excessive viciousness is characterized by communicative behaviors that are 
disproportionately excessive to the amount of anger the subject feels. In both 
cases, what counts as deficient and excessive will be partly determined by 
implicit display rules that an angrily vicious person is either insensitive toward 
or uncaring about-though as discussed above the ultimate determinate of 
excellence will be the reactions of a properly virtuous interlocutor. 
The Viciously Meek and Wrathful 
Applying the above accounts of vice, we can characterize the viciously meek 
person as deficient with respect to all the functions of anger: he fails to feel 
anger in situations where it is fitting and feels less anger than is fitting for the 
situation. If and when he is angry, he is afraid of confrontation and is not 
motivated to change the situation. He doesn't express his anger and experi-
ences the anger of others as an attack, not a protest. The danger of vicious 
88 Berkowitz (1993). 
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meekness is not taking oneself seriously as a moral agent. The meek person 
fails to stand effectively for what is morally desirable. 
On the other hand, the wrathful person is excessive with respect to all 
three functions of anger: he gets angry in situations where it is unfitting and 
is angrier than the situation warrants. He acts aggressively and impulsively 
toward others. He is quick to communicate his excessive anger. He experi-
ences the anger of others as calling his authority into question, which tends to 
infuriate him further. The moral danger of wrath is moral overconfidence and 
moral insensitivity. The threat of the wrathful person's anger often discour-
ages others from legitimately challenging his authority. This can lead to him 
growing in overconfidence and insensitivity-wrath can thus enter into an 
increasingly vicious cycle with pride.89 Finally, a person I will call 'charismat-
ically wrathful' extends, through communication, this moral overconfidence 
and insensitivity to others. Such a person stands against the good and with 
the bad predominantly through his ability to lead others to do his dirty work 
for him. 
Parting Notes 
In this chapter, I've relied on the examples of virtuous anger presented by 
Frederick Douglass and Martin Luther King, Jr to offer an account of angry 
virtue and vice that has a number of attractive features. First and perhaps 
foremost, the account is psychologically realistic as well as philosophically 
informed. Part of the value of the situationist critique of virtue theory-no 
matter what one thinks of the critique itself-is that it has forced philosophers 
to be more sensitive to empirical evidence about human psychology. But there 
is also something psychology can gain from philosophy: for one, the under-
standing that the emotion-appraisal link is conceptual, rather than empirical. 
Further, rather than seeking to evaluate angry virtue merely along one func-
tion that anger serves, my account is valuable in offering a nuanced account of 
angry virtue and vice. 
Finally, my account also gives us a ready way to understand the use of 
common vice terms as describing particular sorts of moral failings, rather than 
just being one more way of saying 'viciously bad.' So we can understand 
someone who is furious as someone whose anger is so off the charts with 
respect to its target that it appears unfitting. But if such a person restrains 
herself and is able to constrain her actions and motivation, she may well 
approximate virtue to some degree. My account also offers a way to under-
stand the unique vice attendant in resentment. Someone who is resentful is 
89 Taylor (2006), 84. 
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someone whose anger tracks, to some degree, wrongs or injustices, but who is 
then deficient with respect to motivation and communication.90 Because he is 
deficient in those respects, he fails to change the situation, which then leads to 
anger at those who fail to respond as he wishes. Thus, the resentful person is 
also subject to a vicious feedback loop-his inability to stand against the bad 
leads to him seeing injustices and wrongs where there are none, which in turn 
leads to motivations and communications that fail yet again, leading him to 
recurrent anger.91 Such a person emphasizes the necessity of excellence in all 
three functions for achieving angry virtue and avoiding vice.92 
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